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 Weathering the 'Murphy' Storm: IP Domestic Litigation and Industrial Consolidation as pragmatic 
responses to the Court of Justice’s decision? 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
The Murphy judgment, decided in 2011, has had a significant impact on the way in which the rules on 
the single market affect the exercise of exclusive broadcasting rights within the European Union (‘EU’).  
Since the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) de facto outlawed the “territorial exclusivity” 
hitherto granted to licensees of sports broadcasting rights across the EU, the judgment was expected 
to have significant consequences on the industrial and commercial strategies of major broadcasters.  
This article explores the impact of Murphy on the dynamics of this particular sector of the audiovisual 
media industry and focuses on the actions of Sky plc (formerly BSkyB) who owns the right to broadcast 
live matches involving several major English Premier League clubs.  It will be suggested that through 
its merger, post-Murphy, with its German and Italian arms, BSkyB appeared to act, albeit in the 
background, to protect its position in the industry and gain a foothold in very lucrative and still partly 
untapped pan-European markets. 
         This contribution will also explore the recent IP litigation initiated by the Football Association 
Premier League (FAPL) in English and Scottish courts designed to rein in landlords and tenants seeking 
to rely on the free movement rights confirmed in the 2011 judgment.  It will be queried to what extent 
these various strategies can be read as an attempt by rights holders to “limit the damage” to the value 
of their investments in expensive media content caused by Murphy. 
          The article will argue that whether the choice of BskyB to rely on a merger with its Italian and 
German counterparts, on the one hand, and recourse to copyright litigation in national courts by 
licensors or sports broadcasting rights, on the other hand, may be constructed as a “response” to the 
challenges that the Murphy preliminary ruling posed remains unclear.  It will be concluded that as the 
EU market for the provision of audiovisual media services continues to evolve, both as regards the 
nature of the content being communicated and of the means trough which this is transmitted, the 
extent to which existing licensing practices can be attuned to the need to safeguard the rights of 
licensors and licensees while at the same time assuring the good functioning of the internal market 
remains an open question.  Nonetheless, as the industry players look for novel, more efficient ways of 
supplying their content, on the one hand, and the EU authorities pursue the goal of a EU-wide digital 
single market, on the other hand, significant policy changes may be afoot to reconcile the inevitable 
territorial segmentation characterising this industry with the demands of a sector where industrial 
conglomerates seem to have become a familiar feature. 
2. A brief overview of the CJEU Murphy decision  
There has been extensive commentary on the preliminary ruling in Murphy and it is not the purpose 
of this article to condense the ebb and flow of this debate.1  It may nonetheless be helpful to set out 
the CJEU’s findings and conclusions.  The case arose from a preliminary reference made by the English 
High Court in the course of criminal proceedings initiated by the Football Association Premier League 
(FAPL) against Mrs Karen Murphy, a pub landlady.  She had been accused of using an “unauthorised 
device” (namely a decoder card purchased in Greece from NOVA, the broadcaster licensed to 
                                                          
1 See e.g. Robertson, “Murphy’s law”, in Buttigieg (Ed), Rights and Remedies in a liberalised and competitive 
internal market, 2012: Malta, p. 197; Pibworth, “The Murphy judgment: not quite full time for football 
broadcasting rights”, (2012) 8(2) CompLRev 209; Doukas, “The Sky is not the (only) limit: sports broadcasting 
without frontiers and the Court of Justice”, (2012) 37(5) ELRev 605; Margoni, “The protection of sports events 
in the EU”, (2016) 47(4) IIC 386. 
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broadcast images of the FALP games in Greece in regime of exclusivity) to receive the signal which was 
being beamed from Greece and which could be received also in the UK in order to screen these events 
in her commercial premises.2   
         Civil proceedings were also ongoing, in parallel to the criminal ones: BskyB claimed that although 
the decoding device was purchased in Greece from the lawful licensee of FAPL rights, it had been used 
unlawfully since its holder had relied on it to receive and transmit satellite images outside the territory 
for which NOVA was authorised to sell it.3  In their defence, the respondents alleged that the territorial 
limits placed by the licensor on the right of cardholders to receive the broadcasts in a different 
member states conflicted with the rules on free movement of services and genuine competition 
enshrined in the TFEU.4  It was also argued that the licensing agreements, in as much as they had been 
assisted by an absolute territorial protection clause, were incompatible with Article 101(1) TFEU by 
reason of their ‘object’, in that they led to the “artificial maintenance” of national boundaries within 
the internal market.5 
         The referring courts raised four distinct questions: was the use of the “Greek” decoder card to 
capture and relay football matches within the UK constituted unlawful use of an “unauthorised 
device”?6 Could the holder of copyrighted material included in an unauthorised broadcast enforce its 
IP rights in the civil proceedings? The domestic judge also queried whether the FAPL and its licensees 
in the UK could rely on the exclusivity clause contained in the licensing agreements in order to prevent 
the unauthorised broadcast without infringing the EU Treaty rules on the free movement of services 
and whether the same clause contravened Article 101(1) TFEU.7   
          The CJEU rejected the claim that the use of a “foreign” decoder card in a member state other 
than the one of purchase had been unlawful, on the ground that the decoding device had neither been 
“(…)'designed' or 'adapted' to give access” to those services “in an intelligible form without the 
authorisation of the service provider”8 nor  been “manipulated” to allow for the reception of the 
services in issue.9  The CJEU then moved to consider whether domestic rules preventing decoder cards 
from being used outwith the state from which they had been supplied and purchased were compatible 
with the internal market principles in the TFEU. Starting with the rules on free movement of services, 
it was held that since such a limitation resulted in users being unable to receive broadcasting services 
from elsewhere in the Union, it restricted the right of the device users to receive services, in 
accordance with Article 56 TFEU10 and could only be justified by “overriding reasons in the public 
interest”, subject to requirements of “suitability” and of “proportionality”.11   
           Thereafter, the Court considered to what extent the protection of “valuable material” such as 
sports broadcasts could be used to justify restricting the right to free movement of services.12  It 
observed that such limitations could only be justified if they were limited to what was necessary to 
protect the “specific subject-matter” of the rights in question, namely the right of the holder to 
                                                          
2 See Robertson, cit. (fn. 1), pp. 203-205. 
3 Ibid.; see also p. 206. 
4 Id., p. 207; see also FAPL v NetMed and others, [2008] EWHC 1411 (Ch), para. 14; see also para. 13. 
5 Id., para. 55-56; see also para. 39-40. 
6 See Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 1998 on the legal 
protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access, [1998] OJ L320/54. 
7 Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd, [2008] EWHC 1666 (admin), para. 67 and ensuing Appendix; see also 
FAPL v NetMed, cit. (fn. 4), para. 369-375. 
8Joined Cases C-403/98 and 429/98, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and 
Others and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd, [2011] ECR I-9083, para. 64. 
9 Id., para. 66. 
10 Id., para.85-86. 
11 Id., para. 93-95. 
12 Id., para. 96-97; see also para. 102-104. 
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“exploit commercially” that subject matter, by making it available to others upon payment of a fee13  
that was “appropriate (…) for each use of the protected subject-matter”.14 The Court observed that 
such remuneration could be quantified in light of such factors as the size of the audience, actual as 
well as potential, the language in which the content was broadcast and the fact that the programmes 
in issue could be viewed in more than one Member State.15   
             As to the question of whether different prices could be charged in different linguistic and 
national areas across the internal market by the appointed licensees in each zone, the CJEU observed 
that at least in principle, this remuneration could be calculated by taking into account the “peculiar 
character” of the content being broadcast, which in turn could justify subjecting the license to a 
territorial exclusivity clause.16  However, it took the view that the “language-dependent” and hence 
“territorial” nature of the content could not justify allowing licensors to extract a “premium 
remuneration” through exclusivity where the pricing practice led to “artificial price differences”, i.e. 
in differences that could not be justified according to the criteria stated by the Court, in each of the 
partitioned territories.17    
            Thus, the Court held, on the one hand, that it was potentially compatible with the Treaty to 
place geographic limitations on the scope of the TV sports rights granted to licensees due to the 
“language-dependent” and eminently “territorial” nature of these services.  On the other, it would be 
incompatible with the good functioning of the internal market to accompany these limitations with 
an exclusive right to control access to that signal across the EU and in particular to prevent users 
relying on devices purchased in a given Member State from receiving that signal elsewhere within the 
Union.18   It was therefore concluded that the prohibition of the use of a foreign decoder had infringed 
the free movement of services’ rules. Since the licensor in the state where the communication had 
originated had consented that, thanks to the purchase of the decoding device, the purchaser could 
receive and view protected content on which an exclusive license insisted and had been remunerated 
for it, that “subject matter” was not compromised.19   The CJEU held that to prevent users situated 
elsewhere within the internal market to receive and view these images by means of a “foreign” but 
nonetheless “lawful” device” would have gone beyond what was strictly necessary to maintain the 
integrity of the rights licensed to each broadcaster in each member states.20   
           Finally, the Court of Justice addressed the question of whether the territorial exclusivity clause 
contained in the licensing agreements concluded between the FAPL and each of its broadcasting 
rights’ licensees, each in its geographic area of operation, infringed Article 101(1) TFEU.  The Court 
recalled that the granting of exclusive licenses allowing the broadcasting of “protected subject matter” 
in each member state in regime of exclusivity would not have been incompatible with the EU 
competition rules.21 However, the CJEU held that contractual provisions preventing broadcasters from 
supplying decoding devices that enabled access to broadcasting services outside the territory in 
respect of which the license had been granted restrained all cross-border supply of these services and 
consequently led to the internal market being partitioned along national boundaries.22  The Court 
acknowledged that a broadcasting license such as the one at issue in Murphy could have granted to 
                                                          
13 Id., para. 107. 
14 Id., para.  108. 
15 Id., para. 110. 
16 Id., para. 114. 
17 Id., para. 115. 
18 Ibid.; see also para. 117. 
19 Id., para. 119-120. 
20 Ibid.; see also para. 124. 
21 Id., para. 137. 
22 Id., para. 141; see also para. 139-140. 
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the licensee an exclusive right to broadcast “protected content” for a specific period of time and could 
have even limited the territorial reach of that right to areas coinciding with individual member states.23 
Nonetheless, it was held that to extend the scope of that exclusive right as far as to enable the licensee 
to prevent users from receiving the broadcast by means of a foreign, but not illicit, device in another 
member state would have gone beyond what was required to safeguard the “subject-matter” of the 
right in issue,24 since it would have eliminated all competition as regards the cross-border supply of 
these services.25  
          The CJEU, however, subjected these conclusions to an important exception: it held that once the 
broadcasts had been received in a member state other than the one “of origin” of the decoding device, 
the corresponding right of the cardholder to “communicate to the public” those images was 
constrained by the corresponding need to continue safeguarding the integrity of material that had 
been granted copyright protection under domestic law.26   Consequently, if certain elements of the 
broadcast, which were "the expression of the authors' own intellectual creation", were distinct from 
the “subject matter” of the broadcasting rights, i.e. they could be “separated” from the images of the 
matches, as they unfolded on the screen27 and could not have been “communicated to the public” 
without authorisation from the holder of the copyright.28  Thus, the FAPL could legitimately oppose 
the showing to the general public of elements of the transmissions such as “(…) the opening video 
sequence, the Premier League anthem, pre-recorded films showing highlights of recent Premier 
League matches, or various graphics(…)”.29   Nevertheless, the Court emphasised that since this 
exception could not affect private viewing via decoders purchased elsewhere in the EU.30  Where 
transmission of the games was confined to purely domestic premises, it would have remained an 
authorised form of exercise of the right to receive the protected broadcast.31  As a result, the owner 
of the device would not have been obliged to “efface” from the broadcast the “protected elements”, 
i.e. those parts of the broadcast protected by copyright.32 
               It is concluded that the 2011 preliminary ruling provides important guidance in the 
assessment of the legitimacy of licenses concerning the broadcasting of sports events in light of the 
EU internal market rules.  It is suggested that as a result of this decision broadcasters can no longer 
opposed certain forms of “unauthorised” transmission and reception of this type of content in a 
member state other than the one in which a decoding device had legitimately been purchased, albeit 
under certain conditions applicable only to “communications to the public” of protected images. 
Consequently, it seems to have become much more difficult for holders of expensive and “hard won” 
broadcasting rights to uphold the territorial exclusivity of these licenses as well as to obtain “premium 
profits” from the exploitation of their rights.33   The next section will consider some of the implications 
that the Murphy judgment could have for the licensing of other audiovisual rights.  
 
3.  The aftermath of Murphy. From football to movies… all change? 
                                                          
23 Case 262/81, Coditel v Cine Vog (No 2), [1982] ECR 3381, para. 15-16. 
24 Murphy, para. 139, 142. 
25 See Murphy, para. 141-143; cf. Coditel (no 2), cit. (fn. 23), para. 9, 15. 
26 Id., para. 154. 
27 Id., para. 155; see also para. 149. 
28 Ibid.; see also para. 156-157. 
29 Id., para. 148-149, 158. 
30 Id., para. 175. 
31 Id., para. 177. 
32 Id., para. 181-182. 
33 See inter alia Robertson, cit. (fn. 1), pp. 215-217; see also Pibworth, “The Murphy judgment: not quite full 
time for football broadcasting rights”, (2012) 8(2) CompLRev 209, p. 214. 
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The previous section highlighted that the CJEU in Murphy sought to limit considerably any inroads into 
the scope of the internal market rules, especially by adopting a very narrow view of what constitutes 
the “specific subject-matter” of broadcasting rights.34   Commentators interpreted the judgment as a 
strong restatement of the goal of market integration in relation to the broadcasting industry and as 
giving an unambiguous warning that any attempt to resort to price discrimination to land “premium 
remuneration” would be caught by the competition and free movement rules.35 
        It is thus difficult to understate the importance of Murphy.  Admittedly, if regard is to be had to 
the now well-established approaches adopted in the field of EU antitrust law vis-à-vis territorial 
exclusivity generally, the 2011 preliminary ruling is consistent with long-held views as to the illegality 
of arrangement resulting in the partitioning of the internal market.36   However, to what extent does 
the decision question the continuing legitimacy under EU law of current approaches to licensing in 
relation to other types of audiovisual content, such as films or TV series?  On this point, it has been 
shown in recent literature that the ability of pay-TV and pay-per-view broadcasters to offer audiences 
"premium content" of this type has become essential for incumbents as well as new entrants.37 
Consequently, it is suggested that due to the high costs of acquiring such content, if the Murphy ruling 
were to apply in a similar way in this context, it could discourage broadcasters, especially new or 
smaller ones, from bidding for the associated broadcasting rights.  
           This section examines whether the principles enshrined in the 2011 preliminary ruling can be 
relied upon to allow the reception of films and other similar content outwith the territory where the 
relevant decoding device was originally purchased in the same way as for live sports' programmes. It 
is acknowledged that the limited remit of this paper does not allow for a full examination of these 
issues, which go to the core of the interplay between the demands of the internal market and the 
need to preserve the integrity of copyright and other "neighbouring rights",38  nonetheless, some 
summary considerations can and should be made.   
           The justification for protecting films by way of copyright lies in their nature as 'works', authored 
by one or more individuals and thus constituting the outcome of their "intellectual creation".39  By 
contrast, sports events have received different forms of protection in the legal systems of the member 
states.  According to the CJEU, a sporting event as such does not enjoy protection via "traditional" 
intellectual property rights:40 in other words, images of sports events that are transmitted on air after 
being selected and assembled by a director, as opposed to the unfolding of the event itself, should be 
considered sufficiently original and thereby would justify the extension of copyright in domestic law.41  
Nonetheless, the Court has accepted that this does not prevent domestic legislatures protecting the 
economic value of such content, in view of its "unique and to that extent original character", through 
entitlements akin to copyright.42  It was emphasised that due to the "scarcity" and "exclusivity" of 
                                                          
34 Doukas, “The Sky is not the (only) limit: sports broadcasting without frontiers and the Court of Justice”, 
(2012) 37(5) ELRev 605, p. 612-613. 
35 Ibid.; see also, inter alia Pibworth, cit. (fn. 33), p. 212-213. 
36 See e.g. case C-501/06, GSK Services and others v Commission, [2009] ECR I-9291, especially paras. 59-64. 
37 See Geradin, "Competition law problems raised by the entry of incumbent telecommunication operators in 
the media content delivery market", paper given at the University of Zurich, 7 December 2005, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=796066, especially pp. 6-8. 
38 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, case C-395/87, Ministere Public v Tournier, [1989] ECR 2521; C-607/11, ITV v 
Catch Up TV, [2013] ECR I-147; for commentary see inter alia Rosati, "Toward an EU-wide copyright?", (2013) 
IPQ 47. 
39 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, case C-5/08, Infopaq, [2009] ECR I-6569; for commentary, inter alia Rosati, cit. 
(fn. 38), pp. 52-54. 
40 See Murphy, para. 99. 
41 See Murphy, para. 149-150, 98-100; see also Margoni, "The protection of sports events in the EU", available 
at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2652991, pp. 9-10. 
42 Ibid. 
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premium sports rights, their acquisition creates significant economic risks for undertakings so that it 
is essential to ensure that their investment value is effectively protected.43   
At the same time, the right to broadcast these events in a regime of exclusivity vis-a-vis other 
broadcasters remains a financially significant "commodity" for TV channels and, increasingly so, for 
"new media" companies.  It is for these reasons that the "owners" of the exclusive right to transmit 
live images (i.e. the national football leagues, representing individual clubs) have been obliged to 
engage in open and transparent tendering processes for their sale as well as to avoid, inter alia, the 
selling of specific "bundles" of broadcasting rights for prized teams and matches to the same bidder.44 
However, the ubiquitous practice of "protecting" the position of the winning bidder via the conferral 
of territorially exclusive rights has been brought back into question by the 2011 ruling, on the ground 
that licensees are no longer entitled to enjoy absolute territorial protection for their broadcasting 
rights in exchange for a “premium fee”. 45   
 Against this background, it is not surprising that several commentators hailed Murphy as a 
"game-changer" in respect of the hitherto leading legal approaches to the licensing of broadcasting 
rights, whether to sports' events or, conceivably, cinematic and other audiovisual content.  It was 
feared that as a result of the 2011 ruling individual broadcasters would no longer be able to protect 
the value of their investment against foreign rivals, who may have paid "less" for the purchase of the 
right to transmit live images of the same events in their own territory; it was also argued that an 
inability to reap a "more than normal" profit would jeopardise the ability of individual companies to 
reinvest in more innovative programmes in the future, as well as to cover the costs required to 
promote content currently being shown.46   
So what impact has Murphy had on earlier jurisprudence relating to the licensing of films and 
other audiovisual content?  As was confirmed by the CJEU in Murphy itself, in principle it remains 
legitimate for a licensee of cinematic content to exploit its right to "first showing" and to safeguard 
and exploit its right to "control" future releases in a given territory, for which it had been appointed 
exclusive distributor, in line with the earlier Coditel decision.47  In Coditel the Court had held that 
copyright in cinematic works could not be "exhausted" simply as a result of one airing.48 Since this 
type of material could be "communicated to the public" via performances that could be repeated 
indefinitely, the “subject matter” of the right should be recognised as encompassing the entitlement 
to a fee for each showing of the film, calculated on the basis of the approximate size of the audience 
resulting from the release and transmission.49      
           As  to the compatibility with the Treaty of exclusive territorial clauses, the Court in Coditel 
observed that these arrangements reflected key features of the relevant market in the EU,50 such as 
the existence of pronounced cultural and linguistic differences on the demand side and, on the supply 
side, the reliance on public funding, which was awarded on a national basis according to criteria and 
procedures that varied from Member State to Member State and often in the broader context of a 
tightly regulated TV broadcasting industry in general.51  Moreover, such funding took place in the 
context of broadcasting systems that, at least at the time, still functioned as state monopolies in all 
member states.52   In light of the forgoing the Court concluded that it would have been "impractical" 
for licensors to rely on criteria other than those based on geographic principles in order to determine 
                                                          
43 Ibid.; see also Margoni, cit. (fn. 41), p. 7. 
44 Margoni, cit. (fn. 41), pp. 2-3; also Geradin, cit. (fn. 37), pp. 71-72. 
45 Murphy, para. 118-121; see also para. 106 and 122. 
46 See inter alia Donders and Van Rompuy, " The EBU Eurovision System governing the joint buying of sports 
broadcasting rights”, (2013) 9(2) CompLRev 7, pp. 22-23. 
47 Case 62/79, Coditel v Cine-Vogt (no 1) (hereinafter referred to as Coditel I), [1980] ECR 881, para. 12-13. 
48 Id., para. 14. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Coditel II, cit. (fn. 47), para. 15-16. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Id., para. 17. 
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the scope of the rights enjoyed by each licensee.53  The legal and economic context in which these 
arrangements took effect thus provided a justification for subjecting the licensees' exclusive 
prerogatives to territorial criteria, even when this resulted in re-erecting national boundaries. To what 
extent can it be argued that the Coditel jurisprudence has in effect been overruled by Murphy? Or 
should the judgment be read in a more restrictive manner and its reach limited to encompassing only 
the “communication to the public” of live sports events?   
     At the outset, it should be noted that a significant difference exists between the facts of 
Murphy and Coditel: the latter case concerned the unauthorised showing of a film in a member state 
other than the one for which a license had been granted, while in the former, the owner of the 
decoding device had, by purchasing it from a licensee authorised to sell such devices in the member 
state from which the signal was transmitted, obtained such permission.54 It has consequently been 
suggested that in Murphy the user, by purchasing a decoding device from an authorised dealer—albeit 
one based in a member state other from the one in which the protected images were viewed—had 
engaged in a “permitted viewing” of the sports events concerned.55  By contrast, in Coditel no such 
permission had been granted—in other words, the viewing had not been authorised by the rightful 
licence-holder.56  It may therefore be argued that in Murphy, as opposed to in earlier decisions, some 
form of “assent” to the viewing had been given and a reward afforded to the licensee—via the 
payment of a fee associated with the purchase of a decoding device “somewhere” in the EU— and as 
a result, the “core” function of the right enjoyed by the FAPL had been respected.  Thus, any other 
restriction on the freedom of viewers to receive broadcasting services anywhere in the internal market 
would have represented a disproportionate interference with the free movement principles.57 
It is however submitted that a perhaps more convincing argument in favour of limiting the 
reach of Murphy only to sports broadcasting stems from a closer scrutiny of the nature of film rights. 
It is suggested that given the "peculiar" nature of these rights, the grant of absolute territorial 
restrictions in the field of film licensing may not lead to an "artificial" partitioning of the internal 
market.58 It may be recalled that in Coditel II the CJEU linked the relevance of geographic criteria in 
the field of film licensing to distinctive features of the cinema industry, which remains predominantly 
organised along national boundaries.59  On that basis, it was held that the “legal and economic 
context” in which these licensing deals were stipulated justified objectively the imposition of territorial 
limitations. 60  Specifically, the Court of Justice appeared to suggest in Coditel and later in Murphy that 
when it comes to the “communication to the public” of films—namely to their repeatable 
performance—this outcome may be inevitable.61  
           The above conclusions seem to have been confirmed by recent economic analysis of the 
broadcasting industry in the EU.  An independent report, published in 2014 by the Centre for European 
Policy Studies, pointed to the existence of significant, objective barriers to entry and expansion 
preventing the full integration of national film markets into an EU-wide one.  It was illustrated that on 
the supply-side, European producers tend to have a relatively small financial size and consequently do 
not enjoy the same bargaining power vis-à-vis their larger non-European rivals when negotiating with 
distributors or TV channels and networks.62  It has also been suggested that cultural and linguistic 
                                                          
53 Ibid. 
54 Murphy, para. 113-116. 
55 Id., para. 120. 
56 Ibid.; see also para. 115-116; see also Coditel (no 2), cit. (fn. 47), para. 15-16. 
57 Murphy, para. 115-116. 
58 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, Geradin, cit. (fn. 37), pp. 87-88. 
59 Coditel (no 2), cit. (fn. 47), para. 15-16. 
60 Id., para. 15-16. 
61 Id., para. 17; see also para. 15; for commentary, inter alia McKnight, “Copyright and a single market in 
broadcasting”, (1992) 14(10) EIPR 343, pp. 347-348. 
62Centre for European Policy Studies, Report: Copyright in the EU Digital Single Market (2013), available at: 
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Copyright%20in%20the%20EU%20Digital%20Single%20Market%20FINAL%
20e-version.pdf, hereinafter referred to as ‘CEPS Report’, p. 53. 
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diversity, with varying preferences and demand specificities in each member state, require each 
producer to invest in the adaptation of content (e.g. by financing translation and dubbing) if they are 
to export successfully to different geographic areas within the Union.63 As a result, film and TV series 
production companies tend to target their production and marketing efforts only at those areas in 
which they forecast the greatest demand.64     It is added that film companies often rely on public 
subsidies (which are awarded on a national basis) as a means of financing their activities and that 
distributors and cinema owners, who are entrusted with distributing cinematic content to the public, 
are usually required to expend substantial resources in targeting advertising and promotion 
campaigns to the local population through localised efforts.65  
          In light of the forgoing analysis, it appears difficult to conclude that the the Coditel approach has 
become obsolete as a result of Murphy, at least as far as the “communication to the public” of films is 
concerned.  It is argued that, notwithstanding the increasing reliance on online platforms and other 
“de-localised” channels for the communication to the public of films and TV series, 66 the “territorial 
nature” of film production emerges as a clear feature of this industry. 67  In other words, the 
characteristics of the “legal and economic context” in which the “communication to the public” of 
films and other cinematic content occur appear to point to the conclusion that it would not be a 
“disproportionate” restriction of the free movement of broadcasting services within the EU to afford 
to the licensee the right to exploit commercially the “first showing” and more generally to control 
further performances of a film in a regime of absolute territorial protection.   
           It is therefore submitted that individual licenses providing for absolute territorial protection for 
the licensee’s rights would not be contrary to the Treaty rules: so long as these clauses are linked to 
objective factors characterising the industry, such as, for instance, the need to protect investment in 
the “linguistic adaptation” of individual productions, these arrangements are likely to remain 
compatible with the internal market principles: in this context, it is added that if the license allows the 
licensor to obtain “premium” royalties, the latter would not infringe Article 56, provided that they are 
the only way  in which these investments can be recouped.68  It cannot however be excluded that the 
status quo outlined above may change in the near future: the 2016 EU Commission’s Communication 
as regards the promotion of a “fair, efficient and competitive European copyright-based economy in 
the digital single market” makes it a priority to increase the availability of audio-visual works 
throughout the Union.69  Whether by actively encouraging the adoption of “streamlined” licensing 
practices or the reliance upon innovative channels for the provision of these services, especially in 
areas that are geographically difficult to reach, the EU institutions have expressed a clear commitment 
to tackling the features of the industry that may strand in the way of integrating otherwise ostensibly 
“national” markets.70  For this purpose, the Communication highlights as one of its priorities 
                                                          
63 See inter alia, mutatis mutandis, European Commission Joint Research Centre, Gomez and Martens, Digital 
Economy Working Paper 2015-04: “Language, copyright and geographic segmentation in the EU digital single 
market for music and film” (hereinafter referred to as JRC report), available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/default/files/JRC92236_Language_Copyright.pdf, p. 18. 
64 Ibid.; see also, mutatis mutandis, Burri Nenova, “The reform of the Community Audio-visual Media Directive: 
television without cultural diversity”, (2007) 14(2) IJCP 169, pp. 171-173. 
65 Ibid. 
66 See e.g. Proposal for a new Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending Directive 
2010/13/EC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in 
Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services in view of changing market realities, 
adopted on 25 May 2016, {SWD(2016) 168 final}, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1464618463840&uri=COM:2016:287:FIN.  
67 See CEPS report, p. 56; see also, mutatis mutandis, Stothers, “Copyright and the ECT Treaty: movies, films 
and football”, (2009) 31(5) EIPR 272, pp. 278-279. 
68 See e.g. Coditel II, para. 16-17; also Murphy, para. 104-108; also para. 118-121. 
69 See EU Commission, Communication of 14 September 2016, (2016)COM 592 final, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0592.  
70 Id., p. 2-3. 
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“increasing efficiency” in the allocation of EU funding devoted to financing dubbing and subtitling of 
content so that the latter can reach out to a wider, cross-border audience.71 
 The preceding observations can be usefully compared with the position of live sports 
broadcasts. In addition to lacking the same degree of “originality” characteristic of films, these 
programmes tend to be less “language-dependent” and, especially when it comes to high profile 
sports (such as football), less “local” in terms of viewers’ preferences.72  As is confirmed by the 
circumstances of the Murphy case, the exclusive right to screen “popular” events such as English 
Premier League matches represents a “valuable commodity” not just in the United Kingdom but also 
in Malta, Greece and other states within the EU.73  It may also be noted that, as is now established 
practice for Sky plc, these events can be viewed without the aid of a voice feed that is usually offered 
in the language of the state where the signal originated—in other words, the language of the “official” 
licensee for the Premier League in a given area.74 
        In light of the forgoing, it is argued that audiovisual services of this kind are far more “mobile” 
than those relating to cinematic content and that the conditions for granting absolute territorial 
protection to licensees will be difficult to make out, any such restriction being likely to be considered 
simply a means of maximising profit.75  Nor is this approach incompatible with the right for the parties 
to negotiate a fee that takes into due consideration the size of the audience that may access the 
broadcast.  Since live sports’ broadcasts can only be received via a decoding device or a pay-per-view 
platform the licensor would be in a position to gauge the audience interested in viewing its services.  
It would consequently be open to the parties to a licensing agreement to fix a payment reflecting the 
possibility that this audience may “straddle” multiple areas of the Union, going beyond the confines 
of a specific language group.76  
          Finally, it is suggested that additional concerns for market access, especially vis-à-vis new 
entrants and especially undertakings seeking to compete on the audio-visual content market by 
relying on new technologies (such as internet webcasting), may justify a more proactive approach to 
antitrust intervention in the field of sports rights.  It is argued that maintaining EU markets for audio-
visual services as open and unsegmented as possible is indispensable to forestall increased 
concentration in the face of significant barriers to entry and expansion. 77  Consequently, it is suggested 
that so long as the minimum requirement of “authorisation” in the country of origin of the decoding 
device is fulfilled, allowing the free movement of this type of broadcasting service would lessen (or at 
least would not contribute to strengthening) the economic power of broadcasters active mainly, if not 
exclusively, in the territory of one member state; it would also avoid erecting barriers to entry that 
are not strictly necessary to safeguards the “subject-matter” of these rights.78    
           It is concluded that the approach upheld by the CJEU in the Murphy preliminary ruling remains 
consistent with the need to attain the market integration goal in an industry where the “commodities” 
being traded—namely sports broadcasting services—have an appeal that goes beyond territorial and 
                                                          
71 Ibid. 
72 See inter alia, mutatis mutandis, European Commission Joint Research Centre, Gomez and Martens, Digital 
Economy Working Paper 2015-04: “Language, copyright and geographic segmentation in the EU digital single 
market for music and film” (hereinafter referred to as JRC report), available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/default/files/JRC92236_Language_Copyright.pdf, p. 18. 
73 Ibid.; see also, mutatis mutandis, Espantaleon, “Exhaustion light in European television”, (2010) 32(1) EIPR 
29, p. 35. 
74 See Donders and Van Rompuy, “The  EBU Eurovision System governing the joint buying of sports 
broadcasting rights”, (2013) 9(2) CompLRev 7, pp. 21-22. 
75 Study on sports’ organisers’ rights in the EU, ASSER Institute, (2014), available at: 
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1353, hereinafter referred to as ‘Asser Report’, pp. 71-72. 
76 See inter alia Margoni, “The protection of sports events in the European Union”, (2015), available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2652991, pp. 15-16; also Espantaleon, cit. (fn. 73), pp. 40-41. 
77 Mutatis mutandis, id., pp. 83-84. 
78Ibid. 
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sometimes linguistic boundaries. 79  However, it would perhaps be “unwise” to extend the remit of the 
Murphy judgment to encompass licenses for the broadcasting of other types of content, such as films 
or TV series, due to the considerable differences that exist in the “legal and economic contexts” 
characterising, respectively, the licensing of rights concerning the “communication to the public” of 
cinematic content and the live broadcasting of sports events.   
   
4. “I feel the earth move”: the reaction to Murphy on the part of the FAPL, BskyB and beyond 
4.1 Reconciling the “territorial” nature of broadcasting with open markets—is Murphy 
heralding more work for IP lawyers? 
The previous section summarised the main grounds of the Murphy preliminary ruling and illustrated 
how this decision has affected much of the “established wisdom” as regards the rules governing TV 
broadcasting licenses.80  This section considers to what extent the judgment has already influenced, 
or is likely to do so in the future, the commercial practices adopted by broadcasters and their licensors. 
In the aftermath of Murphy it was suggested that the only way forward for sports broadcasters would 
be to conclude pan-EU licensing arrangements: by allowing them to set a “Europe-wide” fee—i.e. a 
fee that could take into account the possibility of programmes being received everywhere within the 
Union, regardless of where the signal had originated—these practice would allow both parties to 
protect more effectively the value of their respective investments.81    
          This outcome, however, was regarded as having potentially detrimental effects on licensees and 
eventually also on end users. It was argued that a uniform fee would not allow the “cross-
subsidisation” of resources to support, for instance, more territory specific services and could even 
result, in the longer term, in less content being produced.82  Ultimately, it was suggested that certain 
customers would be hit with a higher bill for their cable and pay-TV packages, on the ground that the 
price would be calculated by taking into consideration demand in more “well-to-do” states.83  
            While the limited remit of this paper does not allow for a full examination of the issues 
surrounding pan-EU licenses, it should be noted at this junction that recent research shows a distinct 
lack of interest in such arrangements in the market for the broadcasting of cinematic content, whether 
via cable or TV or via “new” media (such as the internet).84  The operation of different “time windows” 
for the release of films in individual member states so that producers can “cover costs, secure return 
on investments” and generate enough resources to continue producing new content; continuing 
cultural diversity and linguistic specificities; as well as, on the supply side, the dependency on public, 
nationally awarded funding have made these arrangements extremely complex in practice to 
negotiate.85   
        It is, however, also apparent that any plan in the wake of Murphy, for broadcasters and football 
leagues to agree licensing agreements spanning the whole of the EU  has so far, similarly, failed to gain 
any traction.86   Having regard more specifically to the parties to the Murphy litigation, it is certainly 
true that as a result of this decision the English FA had to renegotiate the terms of its licenses to ensure 
compliance with the new rules.    However, rather than seeking to agree a uniform fee applicable 
across the Union or to limit the freedom of licensees to honour “passive sales” of decoding devices to 
                                                          
79 Geradin, cit. (fn. 37), p. 70. 
80 Murphy, see e.g. para. 97-99, 115-121, 126-132. 
81 See Murphy, para. 112; for commentary see e.g. Pibworth, cit. (fn. 33), pp. 214-215. 
82 See e.g. Robertson, cit. (fn. 1), p. 217-218; see also Doukas, cit. (fn. 34), p. 614. 
83 Inter alia Doukas, loc. ult. cit. 
84 CEPS report, p. 55. 
85 Id., pp. 57-58. 
86 Ibid. 
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customers outside their area, the FAPL instead sought to impose other restrictions in its 
arrangements. As a result, licensees could no longer offer an “official English language feed” to viewers 
outside English speaking areas, i.e. the UK and Ireland.  The FAPL also envisaged the extension of the 
partial embargo time—scheduled for UK and Ireland-based viewers from two till five pm on Saturday 
afternoon—to licensees based elsewhere in the Union, so that they could only air one Premier League 
game on Saturday afternoon.87   
        It was therefore suggested that the English FA had succeeded, at least in part, in minimising the 
significant damage that could have resulted from the 2011 decision, by, on the one hand, ensuring the 
respect of the “embargo time” imposed on “authorised licensees”88 and on the other hand, by leaving 
intact the right, recognised by the Court, of those receiving protected signals anywhere in the Union, 
to choose where to purchase their decoding devices within the internal market.89  However, it is not 
clear whether this represents the last word as to whether these licensing agreements comply with the 
internal market rules.   
Having regard to the “closed period” obligations, it should be remembered that they are part 
of a long-standing practice designed to avoid “undermining attendance or even amateur 
participation” in sports activities.90 Nonetheless, the recent evolution of licensing practices in the field 
of broadcasting has so far pointed to the progressive disappearance of these clauses in many member 
states.  Accordingly, it may be wondered whether, by de facto imposing a uniform ban on broadcasting 
some of the Premier League matches, the conduct of the FAPL could undermine rivalry among media 
content suppliers.  An independent report suggested that the new FAPL licensing terms could over 
time jeopardise the goal of realising a single market for cross-border broadcasting of live sports: the 
inability of individuals to view the matches they wanted at the time they had expected and to receive 
commentary in a language other than their own could adversely affect the enjoyment of their right to 
receive these services anywhere within the Union.91    
In light of the forgoing, it is suggested that as the EU takes concrete steps toward the 
realisation of a border-less market for the provision of audio-visual content via a variety of channels, 
licensors such as the FAPL may have to accept significant changes in their licensing practices, so that 
consumers can have access to a wide array of content at “fairer and more legally secure” conditions.92  
To that end, the EU Commission envisaged, among other initiatives, doing away with “embargoing” 
the transmission of certain forms of valuable content and increasing the interoperability between the 
standards used to, respectively, create and decode cross border programmes.93                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
          It is concluded that Murphy has not to date been as ground-breaking as would have been 
expected for the parties to the proceedings or indeed for the market, seen as a whole.  The pan-EU 
licenses that had initially been considered inevitable as a result of the decision have so far failed to 
emerge. Sports broadcasters and their licensors have opted for a “softer response” to the challenges 
heralded by the ruling, by altering their licensing practices and thereby seeking to discourage the “free 
movement of decoding devices”.  It can therefore be expected that as the EU Commission seeks to 
take action toward the realisation of a fully-functioning digital single market in audio-visual services, 
its proposals will aim to tackle these and other obstacles to the free movement of broadcasting 
services, especially by spearheading change in the licensing practices that have so far characterised 
this industry.  
                                                          
87 See e.g. Asser report, p. 98. 
88 Id., p.100. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Asser report, pp.100-101. 
92 EU Commission, Communication, cit. (fn. 69), p. 3. 
93 Ibid. 
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4.2 Maintaining the integrity of the value of live sports programmes in an increasingly 
integrated market— the role of IP litigation 
 
The previous section examined the immediate impact of the Murphy ruling on the licensing practices 
of the FAPL and its licensed broadcasters, especially BskyB. Since October 2011 the industry has, 
however, continued to change, slowly but steadily, both in its structural make up and in the behaviour 
of its main players.  Accordingly, a question arises as to whether at the core of the strategies adopted 
in the field of civil litigation by the FAPL as well as the industrial reorganisation undertaken by BskyB 
as licensed broadcaster there is a concern to “salvage” some of the economic value attached to their 
investment in sports rights.  This section examines whether the FAPL made a conscious decision to 
rely on its copyright over the “creative” fragments of the broadcasts over which it enjoyed IP rights in 
order to contain any damages caused to its revenue by the showing of football matches via foreign 
devices.  The next section considers consolidation in the broadcasting market.      
           It may be recalled that according to the CJEU in Murphy, a distinction should be drawn between 
the “main broadcast”, i.e. the live images of a sport event, and those elements of the programme that 
are the outcome of an autonomous creative effort on the part of their owner, thus justifying copyright 
protection. These were items such as the FAPL logo, its anthem and the “opening sequences” of each 
broadcast.94  The Court held that unless the person engaged in a “communication to the public” of 
these images through a “foreign” decoding device had obtained a separate copyright license to show 
these “proprietary fragments” of the broadcast,95 they would be liable for copyright infringement if 
they did not take the necessary steps to “efface” these elements from the communication of the main 
programme.96  By contrast, the reproduction of copyrightable material in “purely private circles” 
would have “the sole purpose of enabling the lawful use of the works”.97              
            Fast forward a few years, and the FAPL set out to “work” on what looks like a strategy designed 
to rely on this exception to the “Murphy principle”, at the expense of a number of pub landlords and 
tenants across the British Isles.  Among them was Mr Anthony Luxton, the landlord of the Rhyddings 
Pub in Swansea, who was taken to Court by the Premier League on the ground of having "illicitly used" 
a foreign (in this case, a Danish) decoder card to show football matches in his pub.  No longer able to 
rely on the territorial exclusivity of its licenses, the Premier League resolved to rely instead on the 
"intellectual creation" exception to restrain pubs from showing not the "action" on the pitch, but 
rather the "graphics" and the other "broadcast fragments" that were the outcome of its "creative 
efforts" and over which it retained full copyright.98   
           In FAPL v Luxton, Helen Davies QC successfully argued before the High Court that the defendant 
had infringed the copyright in valuable "proprietary fragments" of the broadcast that were, in the 
words of the CJEU, the fruit of the "intellectual creation" of the FAPL and whose exclusivity could 
therefore be maintained.99 The decision against Luxton was welcomed by the complainant as a victory 
in its effort to protect the value of the Premier League's brand and goodwill in an era in which 
territorial protection was no longer an option.100  Importantly, a FAPL spokesperson stated that this 
                                                          
94 Id., para. 157-159. 
95 Id., para. 158-159. 
96 Id., para. 174; see also para. 197-198, 204. 
97 Id., para. 172. 
98 Football Association Premier League v Luxton, [2014] EWHC 253.  See also http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
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99 Id., per Rose J, para. 30-32. 
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did not represent an isolated case, but was the first of 100 new copyright prosecutions against those 
pub landlords and tenants who had opted to exercise their right to freedom of movement of services, 
as sanctioned by the Murphy judgment without, however, "effacing" the proprietary images and logos 
from their broadcast.101 
           A few weeks later, Mr Berry, responsible for the First National Wine Bar in Liverpool City centre 
became the target of a similar set of writs. Before the High Court the pub landlord admitted to having 
infringed the applicant's copyright102 and consequently the Court awarded the FAPL an interim 
payment of over £60,000.103  Commenting in the local Liverpool Echo, 104 Mr Berry declared:  
 
“They didn’t like me showing the football because they’re not getting anything directly 
from it. I deal with legitimate suppliers. I think they’re pursuing me because I’m a sole 
trader. I’m one person with no money, and they want to make an example.”105  
 
          It only took a few more months before a similar action reached the Scottish Courts. Lisini Pub 
Ltd concerned an attempt on the part of the Scottish Premier League to enjoin the respondent from 
showing matches of teams belonging to the League by using a “foreign device”.  Initially, in 2007 the 
Sheriff Court in Hamilton had granted an interdict to this effect.106  However, in March 2013 the Court 
recalled the interdict following a motion made by Lisini to have the order lifted as a result of the finding 
made by the CJEU that a restriction on the use of foreign decoders and smart cards constituted a 
breach of the competition rules. 107  The following November, the Court of Session, after further 
consideration of the motion, declined to hand down a perpetual interdict to restrain Lisini from 
showing the matches through a “foreign device”.108  In its view, the applicant had provided sufficient 
evidence that, following the  Murphy preliminary ruling, the undertaking originally sanctioned in the 
2007 interdict had become void and unenforceable, on account of infringing the Treaty competition 
rules.109  Thus, due to the impact of the CJEU’s decision in 2011 another set of domestic courts, this 
time in Scotland, is in the position of probing the limits of the “copyright exception” discussed above 
and in particular to decide to what extent a sports broadcasting licensor (in this case the SPL) could 
rely on it to protect the value of its “brand” as exemplified in, inter alia, its logo.110   
            In light of the forgoing analysis, it may be concluded that what the future holds for any 
individual or business wishing to rely on his or her prerogatives as a "good EU citizen" and thereby 
enjoy his or her freedom of movement of services thanks to a foreign decoder card allowing them to 
receive FAPL broadcasts remains uncertain. It may be suggested that private viewers wishing to rely 
on their right to free movement of broadcasting services ‘a la Murphy’ should still be capable of doing 
so without being threatened with legal action by the FAPL or licensors in a similar position to the latter.  
Nonetheless, it is also clear, in light of judgments such as Luxton that business customers engaging in 
the “communication to the public” of protected images may be exposed to significant litigation risks 
if it did not take enough care in “effacing” the broadcast of any proprietary content.   It is  
acknowledged that the scope of the “copyright exception” to the applicability of the free movement 
rules aims to strike a fair balance between the demands of a well-functioning internal market and the 
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need to safeguard the essence of copyright. However, it is unclear whether in practice the difficulties 
surrounding the elimination of proprietary elements from images broadcast from another member 
state could actually discourage undertakings or individuals taking advantage of the option offered to 
them by the Murphy preliminary ruling.  
 
4.3 BskyB and merger policy—carte blanche for maintaining the status quo? 
 
The previous section briefly explored the FAPL’s “litigation response” to Murphy.  This section instead 
examines the possible implications of the 2011 ruling for the licensed broadcasters in each member 
state, as they seek to preserve the value of their investment in costly broadcasting rights against the 
background of a legal landscape in which the “traditional” IP safeguards seems no longer available.     
           In the aftermath of Murphy, commentators argued that prohibiting absolute territorial 
exclusivity as a means of securing a “valuation of content” consistent with the nature and size of the 
audiences in individual areas of the single market, would favour the “emergence of one or more large 
consolidated satellite broadcasters”, active across the EU.111  It was suggested that the outlawing of 
these clauses could create an incentive for broadcasters to merge in order to protect the economic 
value of their investment in licensed—and further licensable—content; to optimise their operational 
structure, especially in respect to those areas in which they had not been hitherto active; and, at the 
same time, to maintain their revenues at an “appealing” level for shareholders.112 This outcome was, 
however, regarded as potentially threatening for the continuing existence of a competitive, pluralistic 
media market. Commentators warned that, if, rivalry would be thwarted, innovation would suffer and 
there would also be an unwelcome trend toward more uniform content.113    
           It is suggested that were media undertakings active in different geographic areas within the EU 
to merge into one concern, the merged entity would as a single firm be able to adopt a licensing policy 
based on territorial restrictions without competition law being applicable to these arrangements.  As 
is well known, the Court of Justice has taken the view that Article 101 TFEU cannot apply to "single 
firm conduct", namely practices adopted within a single corporate group with a view to regulating the 
reciprocal commercial and organisational relations between subsidiaries and parent companies.114  
Thus, “(…) if the undertakings form an economic unit within which the subsidiary has no real freedom 
to determine its course of action on the market, and if the agreements or practices are concerned 
merely with the internal allocation of tasks as between the undertakings (...)", they will not be caught 
by the prohibition enshrined in Article 101(1) TFEU.115  
        It is submitted that the forgoing considerations seem to cast the merger between the Italian and 
German “arms” of Sky TV—hitherto in the hands of 21st Century Fox—and BSkyB in a completely 
different light vis-à-vis the deal adopted at the time.  When the terms of the concentration had been 
agreed and the latter notified to the EU Commission it was suggested that this operation was mainly 
aimed at securing economies of scale and scope across Europe, with clear efficiency gains for all the 
concerned parties.116  BskyB, in particular, seemed to emerge as a clear winner since through this deal 
it obtained access to very lucrative markets where untapped capacity existed and profits could be 
made.  This contrasted with the climate in the UK and Ireland, which had become increasingly 
challenging, especially due to the emergence of new rivals in the markets for pay-TV and pay-per-view 
services, either alone or in combination with the supply of internet access.117  It should however be 
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emphasised that in 2013 James Murdoch, then at the helm of BSkyB, the licensee for a significant 
bundle of broadcasting rights auctioned by the FAPL, had made a clear pledge to “sort out” his 
company’s pay TV strategy across Europe. 118    
           Against this background, it may be queried whether the merger between BskyB, Sky Italia and 
Sky Deutschland was also motivated by a concern to forestall the impact of the Murphy ruling on the 
licensing practices and commercial strategies deployed by the broadcasters.  It is submitted that after 
the buyout the new entity, comprising the hitherto independent broadcasters active in, respectively, 
the UK and Ireland, Italy and Germany, could have reinstated those restrictions on the “free 
movement of decoder cards” or on the geographic reach of specific licenses. It could also conceivably 
have resumed its practice of imposing differing fee levels in each area of the single market, this time 
through a “unilateral decision” aimed at internal re-organisation post-merger, all without being caught 
by the reach of Article 101 TFEU.119  
           Similar concerns were raised in the course of the merger procedure before the EU Commission.  
A number of respondents had submitted that especially after Murphy any consolidation in the market 
for audio-visual content and broadcasting, such as that resulting from the proposed concentration, 
could lead to weaker competition due to the emergence of a large player operating across the 
Union.120  They expressed the concern that such a prominent and economically powerful incumbent 
would have enjoy “enormous negotiating power” and consequently would be able to secure an 
extensive portfolio of broadcasting rights to the detriment of smaller competitors or even new 
entrants who would be unable to bid for valuable content as a result.121   
       Despite the above concerns, the Commission cleared the concentration in July 2014. It rejected 
the argument that the merger would lead to the emergence of an “all-powerful” market player, thus 
significantly weakening competition in the European audio-visual services market; it expressed the 
view that since the activities of the merging parties did not overlap it was unlikely that the merged 
entity could have stifled rivalry in appreciable areas of the EU.122  The Commission acknowledged that 
whereas the Murphy judgment could have significantly influenced the dynamics of the sports 
broadcasting industry, the latter continued to be “naturally” segmented along linguistic and 
geographic lines, which in turn reproduced the boundaries of the member states.123   
          The Commission attached significant importance to the fact that, despite the CJEU’s rejection of 
absolute territorial protection in 2011, the supply of audio-visual media content, including “valuable” 
content such as live sports broadcasts, continued to be allocated as a result of negotiations and 
bidding processes in the individual member states and according to criteria established at national 
and local level.124  It was also pointed out that the demand for “prized” programmes was dependent 
on national parameters, such as consumer preferences, language homogeneity, and cultural 
diversity.125   Having regard more specifically to live sports broadcasting, the Commission noted that 
consumers usually attach greater value to—and were consequently open to pay a higher price for—
the ability to view “home league games” as opposed to matches from foreign series, with the 
important consequence that in this segment of the market demand remained strongly anchored to 
well-defined geographic areas.126   
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             As a result, it was held that the “arms” of the merged entity, active in different member states, 
would continue to bid for broadcasting rights and to further license them to individual consumers 
according to practices and procedures whose features were determined independently and were 
governed by different criteria in each member state.127  It was also emphasised that even if national 
broadcasters had acquired attractive rights’ packages, their new-found strength on the market would 
have been threatened by other, perhaps smaller but equally active competitors such as, among others, 
the Liberty Group.128 On that basis, it was concluded that the emergence of an “EU-wide” broadcasting 
company, capable of operating on a pan-European basis and open to negotiating and concluding 
“continental” licensing practices, was unlikely.129   
         It may be suggested, on the basis of this decision, that although Murphy had a significant impact 
on the licensing practices of the parties, it neither created any significant incentive to negotiate pan-
EU licenses nor encouraged the emergence of a continental champion through merger activity. 130  
However, it cannot be excluded that the current situation will not evolve in a way that leads to 
different outcomes.  It should be borne in mind that the Commission decision was adopted on the 
basis of an ex-ante analysis of the current markets and in particular of the impact on competition that 
could be envisaged as a consequence of the concentration.  It is further observed the outcome of the 
case does not preclude the future, ex post consideration of practices, especially unilateral, that the 
merged entity may undertake vis-à-vis its rivals, and customers and which could be prima facie 
objectionable in light of Article 102 TFEU.131    It is therefore argued that if the merged entity came to 
enjoy significant market power and engaged in, for instance, the application of "different conditions 
to equivalent transactions"; discrimination among customers on the basis of, inter alia, their 
geographic location; or sought to "limit markets", its conduct would infringe Article 102 TFEU.132  
            It is, however, less than clear whether, at least for the time being, the position enjoyed by what 
is now Sky plc within the European media industry, either across the Union as a whole or in individual 
segments within it, meets the dominance requirement provided in Article 102 TFEU. Sky plc has 
undoubtedly come to enjoy a central position in the EU, with approximately 20 million customers in 
total, albeit distributed in markets that remain largely state-based.133  However, it remains 
continuously exposed to significant competitive pressure in key areas of the Union, with BT, for 
instance, threatening its leadership in the UK; Vivendi being rather active across a number of 
continental areas; and other “new media” companies pushing for access in European markets. 134 
         It is concluded that while the market for the supply of “premium media content”—such as live 
sports programmes—has been shaken by the Murphy ruling, the objective characteristics of the 
industry have so far contributed to forestalling the much feared emergence of pan-European, 
consolidated media providers whose activities could be detrimental to the plurality of the media, the 
quality and variety of programmes and consumer choice.  While ongoing changes in the structure of 
the industry may make the national make-up of Sky plc’s subsidiaries more permeable to outside 
pressure over time, we seem to be still some way away from having to be concerned about the loss 
of programme originality and the emergence of broadcasters so large and powerful that they prevent 
the entry and expansion of smaller, perhaps more “territorial”, rivals that can protect cultural 
diversity. 
                                                          
127 Id., para. 41-42. 
128 Id., para. 136-138. 
129 Id., para. 137-138. 
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quarter, 21 April 2015. 
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132 See e.g., mutatis mutandis case 27/76, United Brands Company v Commission, [1978] ECR 207, especially 
paras. 157-160. 
133 See Mance, “Sky: all to play for”, 22 December 2014, available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d83a8000-
851a-11e4-ab4e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3bGjB5uqa.  
134 Ibid. 
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5 The future of sports broadcasting in the internal market: where to now? Tentative conclusions 
 
Broadcasting rights to sports events are a lucrative commodity for sports clubs and leagues and for 
broadcasters throughout the EU.  The auction of FAPL licenses in February 2015, for instance, shows 
just how expensive it can be for media companies to secure the rights to show football matches on 
Pay-TV platforms. BskyB stumped up just over £5 billion to gain the privilege to do just that over the 
course of three years, while BT, its next rival, paid around £3 billion.135  According to Mr Scudamore, 
at the time chair of the Premier League, this reflected the proven prestige, on domestic and 
international stages, of the Premier League clubs.136 Wearing his hat of “shop-steward” of the FAPL 
clubs (if they and their players ever needed a champion), he observed that such revenues were 
required not only to fund players’ pay-cheques, so that they would be able to compete with the big 
European players in a more effective manner, but also to foster a culture of “financially sensible 
management” and support coaching and other community-based activities, especially for young 
people.137 
       It is therefore understandable that both the licensors, i.e. the football associations, and the 
licensees, namely the broadcasters, wish to preserve and exploit as much as possible the economic 
value of their purchases. In the past, territorial exclusivity clauses affecting the free circulation of 
broadcasting services provided a tool to maximise these returns.138  Against this background, the 
Murphy decision was regarded as “throwing a (massive) spanner in the works” of the hitherto tried 
and tested approach to licensing.   
       A few years on, it appears that the “ripples” of the decision re not as menacing to licensors as it 
could have thought at first. As the EU Commission, well-known to be committed to protecting and 
fostering the internal market, illustrated in its 2014 BSkyB merger decision, the market for TV 
broadcasting rights remains stubbornly “national” in its structure, for reasons that have much to do 
with linguistic, cultural and generally “objective” constraints and relatively less, it seems, to do with 
commercial practice.  As a result of the objective characteristics of demand, as well as of the products 
being traded (in turn heavily influenced by the manner of their supply and distribution), the overlap 
between broadcasters operating in different areas of the internal market was found to be very limited, 
so that the merger did not give rise to significant concerns for competition within the industry.139   
         In addition, the IP litigation initiated by the FAPL in the UK may over time dissuade at least 
commercial establishments from relying on the “free movement of decoder devices” to exercise their 
right to receive services anywhere in the EU, providing that authorisation to use the decoder had been 
obtained in the state of origin of the signal.140  However, it cannot be excluded that recourse to justice, 
as in the cases involving Mr Luxton or Mr Berry, could ultimately lead to a finding that the protection 
of the integrity of intellectual property rights, openly recognised as worthy of protection in the Murphy 
judgment, imposes in this context a disproportionate restriction on the free movement of services.141   
         It would be equally premature for competition law scrutiny to take a “back seat” while watching 
how the post-Murphy landscape develops. It cannot be excluded that powerful, pan-European 
broadcasters will not emerge over time as part of a slow trend toward the restructuring of the market, 
                                                          
135 See inter alia “Premier League in record £5.14 bn. TV rights deal”, 10 February 2015, available at: 
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despite its dependency on language and cultural preferences.   Ex-post competition scrutiny is thus 
likely to become increasingly relevant to prevent commercial practices that stretch Murphy to its outer 
limits.142  Similarly, it cannot be ruled out that the competent authorities may find the application of 
differentiated fee structures justified by “(…) circumstances falling within its economic and legal 
context (…)”143 and in particular by “(…) parameters of the broadcasts concerned, such as their actual 
audience, their potential audience and the language version (…)”.144 
       It can therefore be concluded that the Murphy preliminary ruling has had a more limited impact 
on commercial practices, at least so far.  It is accepted that this is an industry where structural factors 
remain relatively fluid and where there is an emerging trend, fostered by the EU authorities 
themselves, toward greater integration.145  Nevertheless, the responses adopted by broadcasters so 
far remain broadly consistent with the “natural territorial barriers” that still characterise the market 
for broadcasting and, more generally, for digital services. The lack of operational overlap on the part 
of undertakings operating in different linguistic and cultural areas, even when they belong to the same 
corporate group, and recourse to litigation based on eminently domestic law, such as that arising from 
allegations of copyright infringement, appear to confirm that the “Murphy effect” has been far more 
contained than previously imagined.146  However, as the EU Commission steers the Union toward 
achieving goals of fuller integration within the audio-visual media services’ industry, we could witness 
policy changes taking shape that could tackle at least some of the problematic consequences 
associated with the “inevitable” segmentation of this market. 
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